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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 09-4686
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
PAUL S. GOLDEN,
Appellant
____________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
(D.C. Crim. No. 1-09-cr-00014-001)
District Judge: Honorable Joseph J. Farnan, Jr.
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 15, 2010
Before: FUENTES, VANASKIE and WEIS, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: July 27, 2010)
____________
OPINION

WEIS, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Paul Golden pled guilty to two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. §§
922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). His presentence investigation report detailed a history of
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psychological problems, and defense counsel likewise acknowledged that defendant
“clearly suffers from a host of mental illnesses.”
During the sentencing hearing, the district judge told defendant that the
Court was aware of his mental health problems and said:
“I have a lot of concern because of what’s been
expressed about your psychological conditions . . .[,]
[and i]t’s clear to me that needs attention. . . . [T]here
certainly will be some help available [in prison and] . . .
next would be during your course of supervised release
to continue with whatever [treatment] has begun
in the institution.”
After orally sentencing defendant to 84 months’ incarceration, the district
judge added, “[w]hile on supervised release . . .. [y]ou are to participate in an
educational, vocational job training, and cognitive behavioral therapy program, including
the U.S. Probation[ ] Office’s Workforce Development Program as directed by your
probation officer.” (emphasis added).
Following the sentencing hearing, the Court entered a written judgment of
sentence, which included a supervised release term: “Defendant shall participate in any
educational, vocational, job training, and cognitive behavioral therapy program, including
the U.S. Probation Office’s Workforce Development Program, as directed by the
probation officer.” (emphasis added).
Defendant timely appealed. Reading the written judgment as requiring him
to participate in “any” program as directed by the probation office, which could choose
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among a list of alternatives that “may or may not” include mental health treatment,
defendant contends that the District Court’s printed judgment plainly erred in delegating
to the probation office the determination whether he would undergo mental health
treatment on supervised release.
We review the defendant’s argument for plain error, see United States v.
Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 248 (3d Cir. 1998) (plain error review used when contentions on
appeal “not raised in the district court”), and will affirm.
A district court impermissibly delegates judicial authority if a defendant “is
required to participate in a mental health intervention only if directed to do so by his
probation officer.” United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting
United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2001)). However, “if the District
Court . . . intend[s] nothing more than to delegate to the probation officer the details with
respect to the selection and schedule of the program, such delegation [i]s proper.” Id.
(citation omitted).
In Pruden, as a condition of supervised release, the defendant was required
to “participate in a mental health treatment program at the discretion of the probation
officer” even though the record in that case did not demonstrate a need for psychological
counseling. 398 F.3d at 250. The delegation was held to be plain error because it gave
the “probation officer the authority to decide whether or not [defendant would] have to
participate in a mental health treatment program.” Id. at 250-51.
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We reached a different result in United States v. Heckman, 592 F.3d 400
(3d Cir. 2010). There, the district court imposed as a condition of supervised release:
“The defendant shall participate in a mental health program for evaluation and/or
treatment as directed by the United States Probation Office. The defendant shall remain
in treatment until satisfactorily discharged and with the approval of the United States
Probation Office.” 592 F.3d at 409. Our decision focused on the defendant’s need for
counseling, the government’s request for it, and the “mandatory” nature of the court’s
language. Id. at 410-11.
Heckman and Pruden demonstrate that the results do “not turn on . . .
semantic differences,” id. at 410 n.13, but rather on the record and the sentencing judge’s
intent. Here, an ambiguity between the judge’s oral use of “an . . . program” and the
printed “any . . . program” may be the result of a simple keyboard error. Ambiguities in
this context do not require reversal. Any question about the matter is quickly resolved by
the sentencing judge’s statements at the hearing, which recognized the need for
continuing treatment during the defendant’s incarceration and supervised release.
Although the District Court might have been more precise in the
preparation of the written judgment, there is no need for remand here. In the interest of
clarity, however, we direct the probation office to provide defendant with mental health
treatment during supervised release. The probation office has been delegated only the
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details with respect to the listed programs.
Accordingly, the Judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
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